Voting via blockchain: a promising future?
Can blockchain voting protect the secret ballot of Article 62 of the Belgian Constitution? An analysis of tests in Groningen and Zug and of remote voting.
Translated from Dutch. The original is the authoritative text. Read the original.
Key points
Article 62 of the Belgian Constitution provides that voting is compulsory and secret. The authors describe blockchain and the tests in Groningen (vote counting, 2018) and Zug (voting via an app with a digital ID), noting advantages such as fraud resistance and live tracking. They conclude that blockchain does not yet sufficiently guarantee the secrecy of the vote, citing leaked keys, recorded vote order and pressure when voting from home.
On Sunday 14 October 2018, the inhabitants of Flemish municipalities entitled to vote took part, compulsorily and in complete confidentiality, in the local and provincial elections. Article 62 of the Belgian Constitution states clearly: ‘voting is compulsory and secret.’ Now that the dust of the past elections has settled, it is time to take a closer look at that article, also in light of new technological developments. The compulsory nature of going to the polls (the so-called ‘duty to turn out’) is regularly called into question. In addition, new technologies are rapidly emerging that could make it unnecessary for citizens to go physically to the voting booth to cast a vote. The crucial question, however, is whether new technologies such as blockchain can guarantee the secrecy of the vote.
Digital voting
In the recent elections, a voting computer was used in 163 of the 308 municipalities in Flanders. Yet voting is still done on paper in 145 municipalities. Futurists have for some time been dreaming aloud of online voting via a computer or smartphone. In principle, an electronic identity card makes it possible to let every inhabitant entitled to vote cast a vote via the internet. One technology stands out in this respect: ‘blockchain’.
What exactly is blockchain?
To the general public, blockchain is mainly known as the technology behind virtual currencies such as bitcoin. Blockchain is, however, much more than that. Originally, blockchain start-ups were mainly focused on the FinTech domain, but nowadays there are also many initiatives in other sectors in Belgium. For example, there are start-ups that want to use blockchain in the supply chain, for Foodtech and for ecosystems. Blockchain may, however, also be interesting for the government, and one could consider deploying it in the electoral process.
But how exactly does such a blockchain work? Put simply, blockchain is a technique for properly managing transactions between many parties that do not necessarily trust each other, without the need for a central intermediary (trusted third party). The best-known application of such transactions without a central intermediary is of course bitcoin. With this virtual currency, transactions are concluded without the intervention of a bank or central administrator. Blockchain is a distributed network in which, for example, a purchase-sale transaction is established irrefutably after validation by all participants in the blockchain network. Blockchain offers a digital archive in which information is stored sequentially in the form of blocks.
Each block is chained to the previous block by means of a so-called cryptographic algorithm (an algorithm that can encrypt all kinds of data). This algorithm, used to chain blocks together, ensures that the information in the chain cannot be altered. An unalterable trail is thus created. Such algorithms are already a common method today for locking sensitive information, such as personal data, or in this case for encoding the electronically cast vote. The technology makes it possible to keep information in a secure and transparent manner. That transparency could, however, cause problems as regards the secrecy of the vote.
Blockchain in the electoral process
In the Dutch city of Groningen, a test was carried out during the referendum of 21 March 2018 on the Intelligence and Security Services Act, in which blockchain technology was used in the voting process. In this way the municipality sought to avoid human error and fraud. In five polling stations, the votes were counted both by hand and with a blockchain application. Voters hardly noticed anything. The polling station merely scanned the QR code on the voting pass one extra time. Turnout could be followed in real time. Afterwards, turnout and the number of votes counted were compared. The counting process was transparent and verifiable for everyone.
In the Swiss city of Zug, sometimes called ‘Crypto Valley’ because of the presence of numerous blockchain start-ups, they went a step further. Since November 2017, all inhabitants of that city can create a digital identity. Via an app they can encode their personal information, after which they receive an ID linked to a cryptographic address on the Ethereum blockchain. They can use this digital ID for the most diverse purposes, from paying parking fines to filing their tax return. On 2 July 2018 a test was carried out in Zug in which the inhabitants could vote on various subjects. It was possible to cast their vote with their digital ID via a mobile app, so that physical presence at the polling station was no longer required.
Unlike the test in Groningen, Zug used blockchain not only to check the votes cast, but also for the actual voting itself. The results of the voting process were, however, not binding, since it was only a test. It does allow the city of Zug and the Swiss authorities to evaluate such technology with a view to possibly applying it on a larger scale later. Such technology would certainly make the organisation of the voting process easier, particularly for Switzerland, a country with a long tradition of direct democracy and numerous referendums.
There are many advantages to applying blockchain in the electoral process. Citizens do not have to go to the polling station to vote, and it is possible to change the vote cast until the moment the polls close. Moreover, it can be verified whether a vote was correctly registered, the count can be followed live, and the system should be fraud-resistant, because all actions within the blockchain network are stored and linked to each other. Particularly in developing countries, which regularly struggle with abuse of power and corruption, blockchain could prove especially valuable because of its fraud resistance. Blockchain thus not only brings direct democracy a step closer, it also makes electoral fraud – both by the government and by third parties – more difficult.
Will we all soon be voting via blockchain?
On the basis of the above advantages, it is tempting to see blockchain technology as a possible revolution of the existing voting process. It is, however, important to consider the current legal framework. Under Article 62 of the Constitution, there is a duty to turn out and secrecy of the vote.
The secrecy of the vote cast is in principle an essential safeguard in a state governed by the rule of law. It must be impossible to establish a link between the identity of the person casting the vote and the content of the vote cast. Otherwise, someone can be put under pressure to cast a particular vote. Throughout the voting process in the Groningen blockchain experiment, measures were therefore taken to guarantee the secrecy of the vote. For example, the scanner that scans the votes at the ballot box was fitted with wide screening panels, so that the ballot paper was hidden from the view of other persons.
But is the secrecy of the vote always guaranteed with blockchain? When voting via smartphone or computer, there are of course security risks such as identity fraud or hacking. If the secret key that gives access to the blockchain leaks, it can be traced who voted for whom. Moreover, the blockchain records the order in which the votes are cast. If you combine the latter with other information, such as the order in which the voting passes were handed in, it is possible to find out the content of the vote. In addition, there are the cyber risks that may arise. Think of malware used to disrupt computer systems, collect sensitive information or gain access to private computer systems. It is also questionable whether the network would not become saturated in a large-scale vote.
Voting from home: not watertight
Moreover, voting from a location of choice may entail a certain degree of influence. Those who vote from home could after all be pressured to vote in a particular way. That is a danger that in principle does not exist in the current voting process: the assessors and the chair of a polling station always ensure that a person is alone in the voting booth and can thus cast a vote in complete freedom and confidentiality.
All things considered, we must conclude that blockchain technology is not yet sufficiently developed to fully secure the electoral process and the fundamental safeguards that go with it, in particular the constitutionally enshrined secrecy of the vote. For the time being, it does not make a secret, infallible, digital vote possible. Those who do not wish to neglect their duty to turn out will therefore, in the near future too, still have to go physically to the voting booth. Within the voting booth itself, blockchain technology could of course possibly be deployed. It is also, of course, questionable whether the potentially adverse effect of voting from home on the secrecy of the vote outweighs the advantages.
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