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Analysis

Constitutional Court upholds Belgium's sex work employment law: dignity and consent

Judgment no. 126/2026 upholds Belgium's 2024 sex work employment law. We analyse the Court's reasoning on human dignity, consent and the 1949 UN Convention.

White neoclassical façade of the Hôtel de Coudenberg on Place Royale, Brussels, seat of the Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court, which upheld the sex work employment law on 12 November 2026, sits in the Hôtel de Coudenberg on Place Royale in Brussels. Photo: EmDee, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons.

Key points

On 12 November 2026 the Belgian Constitutional Court rejected the action for annulment brought by nine associations, including Isala, against the law of 3 May 2024 allowing recognised employers to hire sex workers under an employment contract (judgment no. 126/2026). The Court held that organising the prostitution of consenting adults under that framework is not in itself contrary to human dignity, the 1949 UN Convention, Article 23 of the Constitution or gender equality. It made the rejection conditional on the effective guarantee of sex workers' right to refuse and right to self-determination.

On 12 November 2026 the Constitutional Court rejected the action for annulment of the law of 3 May 2024 on sex work under an employment contract (judgment no. 126/2026). The ruling settles, for now, a contested piece of social legislation adopted during the previous legislature: Belgium's decision to allow recognised employers to hire sex workers on an ordinary employment contract. Constitutionally, the case turned on three questions: whether organising another person's prostitution can ever be compatible with human dignity, whether Belgium may depart from the strict text of a 1949 United Nations convention against the exploitation of prostitution, and whether the law entrenches structural discrimination against women.

The 2024 law

The law of 3 May 2024 "houdende bepalingen betreffende sekswerk onder arbeidsovereenkomst" was published in the Belgian Official Gazette on 6 June 2024 and entered into force on 1 December 2024. It completes the reform of sexual criminal law by the law of 21 March 2022, which decriminalised services to sex workers and the organisation of voluntary sex work within a legal framework, while maintaining the offences of pimping, human trafficking, advertising for prostitution, incitement to prostitution and seeking an abnormal advantage from another person's prostitution.

Under the 2024 law, the contract for a sex worker is an employment contract within the meaning of the law of 3 July 1978, and all of labour and social security law applies to it unless the law provides otherwise. Only adults may be employed. The sex worker may at any moment, without giving reasons, refuse a client or a particular sexual act, interrupt or stop the activity, or impose conditions, and doing so cannot be treated as a breach of contract (Article 7). The worker may end the contract without notice or compensation (Article 8), and employers must appoint a confidential counsellor (Article 10).

Only employers holding a prior recognition may employ sex workers (Article 11). The employer must be a legal person (a private limited company other than a single-member company, a cooperative or a non-profit association) with its seat in Belgium, and its directors may not have been convicted of, among other things, sexual offences or offences relating to prostitution (Article 14). Recognition is granted jointly by the ministers of Justice and Work after consulting the public prosecutor and the labour prosecutor (Articles 15 and 16), and it may be suspended or withdrawn (Article 13). Only a recognised employer acting in conformity with the law escapes liability for pimping (Article 12).

The proceedings

Nine associations whose objects include defending women's rights, among them the Brussels non-profit Isala, lodged the action by registered letter of 6 December 2024. When the case was announced in March 2025, Isala's director Mireia Crespo argued that under the law "the pimp becomes a recognised business leader", while Utsopi spokesperson Daan Bauwens replied that "an employment contract remains the best protection against exploitation", as reported by The Brussels Times. Thirty-six organisations, including a sex workers' union, human rights and health organisations and the socialist trade union ABVV, submitted observations defending the law, as did the Council of Ministers. The Court decided the case without a hearing.

The applicants raised a single plea in three parts, invoking Articles 10, 11, 11bis, 22 and 23 of the Constitution, read together with, among others, Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention of 2 December 1949 for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, and the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions.

The judgment

Human dignity: an ethical question for the legislature

The Court first characterised the question whether organising the prostitution of others is compatible with human dignity and physical integrity as an ethical one, on which it is in the first place for the legislature to make the choices. It recalled that the European Court of Human Rights grants States a wide margin of appreciation in regulating prostitution, as there is no European consensus (V.T. v. France, 11 September 2007). That deference is not unconditional: the legislature has a positive obligation to provide effective safeguards against abuse.

The Court noted that the Constitution does not define human dignity and that the concept is not static, so that the various legislatures may shape its contours. It nevertheless has a minimum content from which no legislature may depart, and, following Strasbourg, prostitution is incompatible with human dignity as soon as it is coerced. Since the criminal framework for forced prostitution and for any abnormal advantage was maintained in full, and since the law's rights of refusal, its recognition requirement and its sanctions under the Social Penal Code specifically aim to prevent violence, exploitation and coercion, the Court concluded that organising the prostitution of consenting persons under such a specific contract is not in itself incompatible with dignity (B.19). It added that it is for the competent courts to ensure that the law is applied in conformity with these standards (B.20).

The 1949 Convention read in light of later international law

The most technical part concerns the 1949 Convention, which Belgium ratified in 1965 and which requires States to punish anyone who exploits the prostitution of another person, even with that person's consent. The legislation section of the Council of State had flagged the issue in its advisory opinion no. 75.261/1 of 13 February 2024. Interpreting the Convention under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court held that its object is to combat trafficking and the exploitation inextricably linked to it. Although the preamble regards all prostitution as incompatible with human dignity, later instruments, notably the 2000 Palermo Protocol on trafficking, clarified the notion of exploitation. The required criminalisation therefore covers acts committed with the specific intent to exploit, which must be distinguished from voluntary sex work. Since such acts remain punishable as abuse of prostitution and trafficking, the non-criminalisation of a recognised employer does not breach the Convention.

Social rights and gender equality

Under Article 23 of the Constitution, which contains a standstill obligation, the Court found no significant reduction in the level of protection: the law gives sex workers full access to labour and social security rights, guarantees the absolute character of their right to refuse, and allows them to leave without adverse financial consequences (B.30.2). On equality between women and men (Article 11bis), the Court accepted that the law, although gender-neutral, mainly affects women, but relied on a 2023 report of the UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls describing a growing international consensus in favour of decriminalising voluntary adult sex work. The legislature could therefore consider that decriminalisation does not compromise the fight against the exploitation of women.

Analysis

Three features of the judgment deserve attention. First, the operative part does not simply reject the action: it does so "taking into account what is stated in B.19 and B.30.2". By this technique the Court ties the constitutionality of a statute to a reading of it, here to the effective guarantee of the right to refuse and the right to self-determination. Practices that hollow out those guarantees would therefore fall outside the law as the Court has validated it, and ordinary courts are expressly invited to police them.

Second, the judgment reflects judicial restraint in ethical matters. It treats the legislature as the primary arbiter of a contested moral question, provided that the choice is accompanied by effective safeguards. Opponents will regret that the abolitionist understanding of dignity, which regards all commercial sex as degrading, was not given constitutional weight. Supporters will see the judgment as confirming that dignity can be protected through rights and labour protection rather than through criminal prohibition. The Court did not choose between these philosophies; it held that the Constitution does not impose either.

Third, the evolutive reading of the 1949 Convention is significant beyond Belgium. The Convention has long been cited as an obstacle to models that permit third parties to organise sex work. By reading it through the Palermo Protocol and requiring a specific intent to exploit, the Court offers a treaty interpretation that other jurisdictions and, potentially, international bodies will scrutinise.

Finally, the socialist union ABVV-Horval welcomed the ruling as an important victory for sex workers, but constitutional validity does not guarantee practical effect. BRUZZ reported in July 2026 that no employer had yet been recognised in the Brussels-Capital Region. The law requires the government to evaluate it two years after its entry into force, that is from December 2026, with particular attention to the situation of sex workers, home-based work and the legal forms of employers.

Conclusion

Judgment no. 126/2026 upholds a framework that The Brussels Times described as a world first, but conditionally: the safeguards of consent and refusal are the reason the law survives, and they now carry constitutional weight. The case is a further example of the Court's recent case law on fundamental rights, alongside its judgment on information about remedies in criminal appeals, and of the review that newly adopted laws such as the home entries law may soon face. It also revives an older debate on how the Court's composition shapes its approach to ethical questions, discussed in our piece on ideological balance in the US Supreme Court and the Belgian Constitutional Court. What to watch next: the statutory evaluation, the number of recognitions, and the first cases in which labour courts apply the rights to refuse and to leave.

Sources

  1. GwH 12 november 2026, nr. 126/2026 / Const. Court 12 November 2026, no. 126/2026
  2. Constitutional Court, press release on judgment no. 126/2026, 12 November 2026
  3. ABVV-Horval, "Uitspraak Grondwettelijk Hof is belangrijke overwinning voor sekswerkers", 13 November 2026
  4. The Brussels Times, "'Sexual slavery': Organisations file petition to annul flagship sex work law", 26 March 2025
  5. BRUZZ, "Negen organisaties willen arbeidswet voor sekswerkers vernietigd zien", 26 March 2025
  6. BRUZZ, "Arbeidswet voor sekswerkers vindt amper weerklank: nog geen erkende werkgevers in Brussel", 6 July 2026