Flemish Government hungry to defederalise Belgian justice: towards a Flemish Council of State?

With the formation of the new Flemish Government, Zuhal Demir became the first federated-entity Minister of Justice and Enforcement. That development is in line with the defederalisation trend that has been under way in Belgium for some time. This is specifically the case in the field of administrative justice, for example through the establishment of Flemish administrative courts. In principle, the establishment of such courts falls within the competence of the federal legislator. Nevertheless, the new Flemish Government wants to make maximum use of the federated entities' possibilities to establish and organise administrative courts. The question arises whether that is possible.

The competence saga of the federated entities regarding the establishment of administrative courts

Under Articles 146 and 161 of the Constitution, courts can only be established by means of a (federal) ‘act’. The federated entities therefore have no express power to establish administrative courts. The starting point is that, in accordance with Article 161 of the Constitution and Article 19, § 1 of the Special Majority Act of 8 August 1980 on Institutional Reform (SMAIR), the organisation and functioning of the Council of State and of the administrative courts fall exclusively within the competence of the federal authority.

Not entirely consistent with that principle, Flanders already years ago relied on the technique of ‘implied powers’ in Article 10 of the SMAIR to establish several administrative courts. In doing so, Flanders entered the field of competence of the federal legislator. The contested nature of this power-allocating technique is obvious. Both the Constitutional Court and the Legislation Section of the Council of State have already scrutinised quite a few legislative initiatives.

The parliamentary history of Article 161 of the Constitution addresses the requirements for and limits to the establishment of federated administrative courts. Federated entities could do this only for ‘specific’ federated administrative courts and insofar as there is a necessity to do so. Moreover, the legislator did not consider it the intention that federated entities could establish a ‘general’ system of administrative courts or a ‘general’ federated administrative court. On that basis, the Constitutional Court (then still the Court of Arbitration), in judgment no. 49/2003, left the door ajar. It accepted that the federated entities can establish an administrative court on the basis of their implied powers. For Article 10 SMAIR to apply, the adopted rules must be necessary for the exercise of the federated entities' powers, the matter must lend itself to differentiated treatment and the impact of the provisions concerned on that matter must be only marginal (B.8.2).

1. Necessary for the exercise of the federated powers

The necessity requirement follows from the wording of Article 10 SMAIR. Only if this is essential for the exercise of their own powers may the federated entities use the implied powers technique to establish federated administrative courts.

Initially, the Legislation Section of the Council of State gave a strict interpretation to the necessity requirement. It approached this requirement as an expertise criterion. More specifically, a federated administrative court must be more specialised in the matters to be dealt with than the Council of State itself.

In judgment no. 8/2011, the Constitutional Court held that the necessity requirement is fulfilled if the new administrative court has more specific expertise and its establishment ensures a swift ruling. It must be stressed that the Constitutional Court reviews this requirement only marginally. The assessment of necessity must thus not be “manifestly incorrect”.

2. The matter lends itself to differentiated treatment

The matter must allow for differentiated rules. That is the case if it appears that the federal legislator itself has subjected the appeals to specific rules. The federal level itself laid down the exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Council of State when that matter still fell within its competence. This requirement is therefore by definition always met.

3. A marginal impact

The requirement of a marginal impact means that the establishment of the administrative court may have only a limited influence on the powers of the federal authority. Where appropriate, it is examined whether the establishment of the new court has consequences for the functioning of the Council of State or, more generally, for the ordinary rules of jurisdiction and procedure at the federal level.

First, the Constitutional Court considers that this criterion is not fulfilled if the establishment restricts the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Second, the impact remains marginal as long as the new court rules exclusively on appeals against individual administrative legal acts. In an opinion of 17 October 2013, the Legislation Section of the Council of State seems to infer from this, a contrario, that appeals against regulatory administrative decisions are excluded. Third, the Constitutional Court clarified in judgment no. 8/2011 that the establishment of the Council for Permit Disputes (RvVB) met the requirement of a marginal impact because the cassation jurisdiction of the Council of State, Administrative Litigation Section (Art. 14, §2 Council of State Act) was not affected. The fact that the Council of State acts as the highest administrative court would guarantee that the impact on the federal competence regarding the administration of justice remains marginal. According to VANNESTE, the Constitutional Court thereby seems to hold that cassation jurisdiction is an exclusive federal power that cannot be transferred on the basis of implied powers.

Towards a general Flemish administrative court: the “Flemish Administrative Council”?

In its coalition agreement, the Jambon I government expresses the wish to establish a single ‘Flemish Administrative Council’ (Vlaamse Bestuursraad). It appears that the government wants to create a ‘Flemish’ Council of State. The question is whether that establishment meets all the conditions of implied powers.

First, a Flemish Council of State is difficult to reconcile with the previously mentioned parliamentary history of Article 161 of the Constitution. It followed from it that the intention was only to establish specific federated administrative courts, whereas the Flemish Government is aiming for one general Flemish court.

Second, the plan is at odds with the case law of the Constitutional Court and the advisory practice of the Council of State. By integrating several federated administrative courts, the necessity requirement of Article 10 SMAIR no longer seems to be fulfilled. If a single federated administrative court can rule on a spectrum of administrative acts ranging from study progress decisions to environmental permits, the required specialisation is no longer present. It is conceivable that specialised chambers will be set up, but that does not alter the fact that a structure is created (a general administrative court) that conflicts with the will of the constitution-maker.

The RvVB as guardian for appeals against spatial implementation plans?

In addition to establishing a Flemish Administrative Council, the Jambon I government wants to transfer the judicial review procedure for Spatial Implementation Plans (RUPs) from the Council of State to the Flemish administrative courts. We see two possible obstacles.

First, a problem may arise as regards the necessity requirement. In the coalition agreement, the transfer of the administrative review procedure seems to rely to a large extent on the argument of faster handling. That is not guaranteed. The former backlog in the assessment of cases by the Council of State was cleared some time ago. The processing time today is largely a function of the statutory procedural steps and time limits. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the procedure before the Council of State takes place in first and last instance. Against a ruling of the federated administrative courts, by contrast, an appeal in cassation is always available, so that the hypothetical length of proceedings is longer in any event. In addition, the extension of the jurisdiction of the RvVB will have to be accompanied by an increase in operating resources. In the past, a lack of such resources led to judicial backlogs.

Second, problems may arise with regard to the requirement of a marginal impact. The Jambon I government does not mention any plans in its coalition agreement to touch the cassation jurisdiction of the Council of State. No problems arise in that respect. The sticking point, however, is the regulatory nature of RUPs. Whereas appeals to the RvVB are so far directed against individual decisions, appeals against regulatory RUPs are not. Admittedly, the RvVB is already competent for appeals against subdivision permits. Subdivision permits are both regulatory and individual in nature. It should be noted that subdivision permits are not comparable with RUPs. A subdivision permit must respect a RUP. In the light of the foregoing development, however, VANPRAET argues that judgment no. 8/2011 of the Constitutional Court deals only with ‘individual administrative legal acts’ because that happened to be the case in the matter at hand, so that a Flemish court does not necessarily have to rule exclusively on appeals against individual administrative legal acts.

Conclusion

In its coalition agreement, the Flemish Government has set itself the goal of making maximum use of the federated entities' possibilities to establish and organise administrative courts. The emphasis lies mainly on the establishment of a Flemish Administrative Council and the transfer of the judicial review procedure for RUPs from the Council of State to the Flemish administrative courts.

The federated entities can establish administrative courts within the conditions laid down by Article 10 SMAIR. The opinions of the Council of State and the judgments of the Constitutional Court outline the conditions and guidelines for this. We believe it is doubtful whether the establishment of a general administrative court (with or without specialised chambers) would pass the review by the Council of State and the Constitutional Court against the conditions for the exercise of implied powers. Moreover, obstacles may also arise when the judicial review procedure for RUPs is transferred to the Flemish administrative courts, in particular with regard to processing time and resources. The Flemish Government would do well to proceed carefully.

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